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A PERSPECTIVE ON AIRLINE
REGULATORY REFORM
JAMES C. MILLER III*
A T A CONFERENCE held in New Hampshire in July of 1972,
the late Paul Cherington, former Assistant Secretary for Pol-
icy at the U.S. Department of Transportation, mused that:
It is safe to conclude that the CAB is here to stay and that its
powers will enlarge, not diminish. I am convinced of this by looking
at the survivability of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Even
when the majority leader in the Senate proposed the complete elim-
ination of that agency (admittedly in a fit of pique), the ICC went
right on cutting out its paper dolls, studying the tariff on Yak fat,
pondering whether it was all right to abandon the rail line from
Overshoe to East Overshoe (even though the trees were so large
that no diesel could get through), meanwhile enjoying the spectacle
of 60% of the eastern railroads slipping into bankruptcy. If an
agency like that can survive (and get larger appropriations and have
the chutzpah to ask for more powers), the CAB will surely flour-
ish.'
About eighteen months later, Feb., 1974 at another conference
devoted (in part) to questions of regulation, George Eads, who
subsequently became Acting Director of the Council on Wage and
Price Stability and who played a large role in the development of
the Administration's regulatory reform program, stated that:
It is quite clear that we are not likely to see a repeat of Joshua's
remarkable victory at Jericho-the mere publication of our results
will not bring down the walls of the... CAB.. . with a great crash.
The battle for deregulation more likely will resemble a classical
medieval siege with much logistical preparation, slow and dirty slog-
* Assistant Director for Government Operations and Research of the Council
on Wage and Price Stability, Executive Office of the President.
I Cherington, The Future of Airline Regulation, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECHNOLOGY 7 (August 28, 1972).
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ging in the trenches, small assaults that will often be repulsed, and
victory through attrition and exhaustion.'
At that same conference, Roy Pulsifer, Assistant Director of the
Bureau of Operating Rights at the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB
or Board) noted:
The question of regulation or deregulation can be summed up
quite succinctly. Economic regulation, in its present form, began
with the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. This legis-
lation was reenacted in 1958 without substantive change. Moreover,
Congress has approved approximately thirty amendments affecting
title IV, the section of the act dealing with economic regulation, and
none of these-not one-indicates any movement toward deregu-
lation. In other words, there has been no chipping away at the basic
commitment to regulation. One could argue, in fact, that a little ce-
ment has been added here and there. I see no effective pressure for
deregulation in air transportation, none whatsoever. If the present
situation is an accurate guide to the future, the Civil Aeronautics
Board will continue to regulate the airlines indefinitely. So much for
deregulation.'
Despite these rather pessimistic prognostications of a year or so
ago, it would appear that any recent reports of deregulation's de-
mise would have been greatly exaggerated. Witness the following
developments:
(1) On October 8, 1975, President Ford sent to Congress a
comprehensive program of airline regulatory reform en-
titled the Aviation Act of 1975. This proposal, now H.R.
10261 and S. 2551, would promote competition by allow-
ing greater price flexibility, greater freedom of entry, and
reductions in the power of the Board to grant antitrust im-
munity.'
(2) The Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure, chaired by Senator Kennedy, held months of
intensive hearings on airline regulation, and issued a draft
report which concludes, "The Board should shift from re-
liance upon the procedures of classical price and profit rate-
2 EADS, Economists Versus Regulators, PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL TRANSPOR-
TATION POLICY 108 (J. MILLER 1975).
3 PULSIFER, A CAB Perspective on Airline Regulation, PERSPECTIVES ON FED-
ERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY 205 (J. MILLER 1975).
4 Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to Congress October -, 1975; Fact
Sheet on Aviation Act of 1975, The White House, October 8, 1975.
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making towards greater reliance upon competitive forces in
an effort to guarantee the widespread provision of low-cost,
efficient service."' (The report goes on to recommend free
entry and removal of minimum price regulation.)
(3) The CAB proposed a limited experiment in deregulation
"to test the effects of freer entry and exit into commercial
aviation markets and more freedom for carriers to set fares
"' The CAB also (a) took steps to end its so-called
route moratorium, preventing entry, (b) withdrew its
guidelines for minimum charter fares and its proposal to
further restrict charter service, (c) rejected certain pro-
posed fare increases, and (d) determined that agreements
among carriers to reduce capacity would not be in the pub-
lic interest at this time.
(4) A special staff group from within the Board, headed by Roy
Pulsifer (mentioned above) and set up to review the issue
of regulatory reform, issued a report which recommended
"that protective entry, exit, and public utility-type price
control in domestic air transportation be eliminated within
three to five years by statutory amendment."' The group
also noted that "tinkering with the regulatory regime while
preserving its fundamental features may be ineffective or
produce perverse consequences. '
What explains this sudden reversal in the outlook for deregula-
tion? For those of us who are still in a mild state of euphoric shock,
the reasons are not quite clear. However, I might offer the follow-
ing speculation. First, over the past two years there have been sig-
nificant increases in air fares-totaling approximately twenty per-
cent. Even though some of the increases were perhaps "justified"
by increases in the price of aircraft fuel, the magnitude of the
I Airline Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board: Report of the Senate Sub-
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure 308 (draft issued June 27,
1975).
6 CAB Suggests Experimental Program to Test Consequences of Deregulation,
CAB Press Release at 1 (July 7, 1975). The Board's proposal was set down as
CAB Docket No. 28048 (July 7, 1975) (see Advance Notice of Proposed Actions,
July 7, 1975).
CAB, REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT OF THE C.A.B. SPECIAL STAFF, Execu-
tive Summary at 2 (July 22, 1975).
1 Id.
1975]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
change did not sit well with the general public. Secondly, during
this period the public became aware of the situation in Texas,
where Southwest Airlines, a non-CAB intrastate carrier, was fight-
ing for its very life against two CAB-certificated carriers, Braniff
and Texas International. The equity of the situation, as well as the
fact that Southwest was charging rates much lower than compar-
able interstate rates, heightened public concern over the protective
attitude of the CAB. Thirdly, there were reports of wide-spread
illegal campaign contributions on the part of regulated air car-
riers. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, there were allega-
tions of improper conduct on the part of Board officers, ranging
from all-expense junkets at airline expense to suppressions of staff
investigations into illegal campaign donations.
Moreover, it would appear that the political climate is ripe for
reform. The House of Representatives has a flock of new fresh per-
sons who generally have a skeptical attitude toward established
ways of doing business. Also in the House, there has been a com-
mittee realignment, shifting responsibility for air transportation
from the Commerce Commitee to the Committee on Public Works
and Transportation; arguably, these new Committee members have
not yet been "captured" by the airline interests. The recent cam-
paign spending reform laws and the attendant public debate pre-
sumably have made elected officials relatively less dependent on or-
ganized givers such as the airlines and their constituents. Consumer
groups, such as Ralph Nader's Aviation Consumer Action Project,
have come out in favor of deregulation, and the media has given
the problem of regulation considerable play. Finally, we observe
political leaders who are willing to spend capital to bring about
needed reforms; importantly, this would appear to be a nonpartisan,
non-ideological issue as witness, for example, the similarity in views
of President Ford and Senator Kennedy.
As Roy Pulsifer noted in the quotation above,9 not once in the
history of federal regulation of the airlines has there been a sig-
nificant curtailment of the Board's powers. Not only that, but to
my knowledge there has never been a serious attempt. But times
have changed: the proponents of reform are serious and battle lines
are being drawn. (Hearings on the Aviation Act of 1975 will in all
' See text accompanying note 3, supra.
A PERSPECTIVE ON REFORM
likelihood take place early this spring.) The rest of my paper out-
lines briefly the major costs of CAB regulation, deals with the issue
of deregulation, responds to its critics, and puts a perspective on the
Administration's proposal.
THE COSTS OF AIRLINE REGULATION
As they pertain to the airlines, economic conditions today are
very much different from what they were in 1938, when airline reg-
ulation was established. At that time, the U.S. Government was
attempting to promote an "infant" industry through an inefficient
system of airmail subsidy. Basically, the government granted con-
tracts to air carriers and prevented competition on those routes
where contracts were granted. Recognizing the potential for excess
profits on passenger services then or in the fuure, carriers would
"buy in" on these contracts for extremely low rates.'" This perfectly
rational economic behavior on the part of the air carrier firms was
then cited as evidence of "destructive competition" in the airline
industry and thus a need for governmental intervention to "ration-
alize" competition.' It was also said that governmental controls
were needed to assure safety of operations.
Today, the domestic airline industry is no longer an infant in-
dustry in need of promotion; having increased in size since 1938
some 250-fold, by most standards it is now truly "mature." Mail
contracts are no longer the vehicle for subsidy, and as a percent of
total domestic revenues subsidy has declined from 31.6 percent in
1939 to less than one percent today. Except for minor payments
to Northeast Airlines in the mid-1960's, the trunk carriers have
been completely off subsidy since 1959." Air safety, which until
1958 was a primary CAB concern, is now vested with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) of the Department of Transporta-
tion."
'0 See R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUSTRY STUDY
124 (1962).
"Note that the legislative "Declaration of Policy" admonishes the Board to
create "[c]ompetition [only?] to the extent necessary to assure the sound develop-
ment of an air-transportation system .... [Original (1938) language now Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, § 1302(d), 40 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1958)].
"See generally, G. EADs, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINES EXPERIMENT (1972).
"$Responsibility for investigating air accidents was transferred from the CAB
to the National Transportation Safety Board in 1966.
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Another important change in the nature of the industry and its
regulation is that the principal city-pair markets today are served
by two or more airlines." Thus, in addition to no longer regulating
so as to promote an infant industry and no longer regulating air
safety, the Board finds itself no longer preoccupied with regulating
monopoly. Instead, its primary activity is regulating competition.
But under CAB regulation this competition is of a rather special
sort: it is manifest almost totally in dimensions other than price.
A potential price-cutter in a CAB-regulated market faces sig-
nificant costs in carrying out such an initiative. First, the carrier
must announce the new rate at least thirty days in advance, there-
by alerting its competition to the intended action." Secondly, there
is the simple cost of publishing the new tariff with the Board (as
legally required). Thirdly, any fare decrease is likely to be pro-
tested by competitors as being unreasonably low, discriminatory,
preferential, prejudicial, or simply an instance of "unfair compe-
tition." Thus, the price-cutter nearly always must make an affir-
mative case before the Board that the new rate is justified, and this,
of course, costs money.
The new rate may be rejected outright or set down for investi-
gation. If it is rejected, then of course any advertising by the car-
rier about the prospective lower rate is lost, and perhaps on bal-
ance creates ill will because the carrier is unable to deliver. If the
rate is suspended, the carrier may either withdraw the initiative or
pursue it further. If the rate reduction is pursued, then significant
procedural costs must be absorbed by the initiating carrier as the
rate travels through various steps: prehearing conference, hearing,
briefs to the Administrative Law Judge, possibly briefs to the full
Board, oral argument, and possibly, in the end, even court chal-
lenges.
Because of these impediments, one observes little price compe-
tition in the airlines. When rates are lowered they are usually done
so in the interest of the whole industry, for example, by introducing
discount fares to enlarge total revenues and to make the airlines
" Note that from 1955 to 1971 the percentage of total revenue passenger miles
attributed to markets where two or more carriers each accounted for at least
10 percent of the market rose from 55.6 percent to 76.6 percent. See G. DOUGLAS
& J. MILLER III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY
AND POLICY 114 (1974).
"1 Thus, there is no such thing as a conventional "sale" in the airline business.
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more effective in competing with other modes of common-carrier
transportation, such as intercity buses. Another ramification of
this constraint system is that from the standpoint of an individual
airline it makes little sense to change the rate in just one market.
In an attempt to "spread the cost," airlines which propose rate re-
ductions usually do so on fairly large chunks of traffic, although
such a strategy inevitably reduces the likelihood of ultimate ap-
proval by the Board and of course raises litigation costs.
The Board's statutory authority to control price and its proce-
dures for implementing that control thus have rendered price com-
petition in the airlines all but nonexistent. On the other hand, there
are other means that carriers have for attracting and competing
for passengers over which the Board exercises little or no direct
control. Such non-price competition takes various forms, including
costlier meals, "free" drinks, expensive advertising, flashy interior
and exterior color schemes, "VIP" airport lounges, on-board
lounges, pianos, bars, and the like. But much more important, in
terms of its ultimate cost to the consumer, is the scheduling form
of non-price competition. As will be discussed below, scheduling
additional flights is the most effective means that individual car-
riers have of attracting additional passengers. Notably, except for
its power to grant antitrust immunity and to orchestrate capacity
agreements among carriers, the Board is prohibited from controll-
ing schedule competition.'
For any price that is approved (or, in essence, "set") by the
Board, the market has a "break-even" load factor (which we define
to include a normal return on investment)." If actual load factors
are below the break-even level, the carriers will be earning less
than a normal profit (or even accounting losses) and will cut back
on capacity. Since market demand is inelastic with respect to ca-
pacity, 8 load factors will rise, and the process of capacity curtail-
ment will continue until actual load factors have risen to the
16Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(4) (1962), amending
49 U.S.C. § 1371(e) (4) (1958), states that "[n]o term, condition, or limitation
of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air carrier to add or change schedules.
""Load factor" is the proportion of seats filled, usually expressed as a per-
centage.
18 That is, the percentage change in total traffic in the market is less than the
percentage change in the market's total capacity.
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break-even level, at which point the incentive to reduce capacity
unilaterally will disappear.19 On the other hand, if actual load fac-
tors exceed the break-even level, individual airlines have profit in-
centives to increase capacity. Actual load factors will fall and the
process will continue until capacity increases have reduced actual
load factors to break-even, at which point there is no more incen-
tive to add to capacity."
An extremely important aspect of this non-price competition is
that there is a whole range of prices which the Board may choose
and still enable competitive returns to the individual carriers (or
at least to the carriers as a group). If the Board chooses a "high"
price, the break-even load factor will be "low" and, in equilibrium,
so will be the actual load factor. If the Board chooses a "low"
price, the break-even load factor will be "high" and, in equilib-
rium, so will be the actual load factor. The nature of this trade-off
between fare and average load factor is displayed in Figure 1."1
Over a fairly wide range of prices, carriers, in equilibrium, will
earn normal profits-and thus, arguably, the choice of price is not
1" Short of the break-even load factor an individual carrier can safely assume
that as it reduces capacity its competitors will also. Once equilibrium has been
reached, however, a carrier reducing capacity unilaterally may not assume that
its competitors will do likewise.
2' When market load factors are above break-even an individual carrier can
make more profit by expanding its own capacity provided other carriers do not
also expand their capacity. The evidence suggests that carriers act as though they
make such an assumption. A variant explanation of observed behavior is that
since an individual carrier may not assume that its competitors will not increase
their capacity it must increase its capacity just to maintain its market share. In
any event, when the break-even load factor is reached, there is no incentive to
increase capacity, since the market load factor will fall below break-even and
each carrier may assume that its competitors will follow a policy of restraint.
See generally DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 14, ch. 4, and the papers cited
therein by De Vany, Douglas, Miller, Straszheim, Yance, Barnekov, Eads, Mil-
ward, and White. See also Miller, Airline Market Shares vs. Capacity Shares and
the Possibility of Loss Equilibria (processed, 1974) and CAB Docket No. 22908
(July 21, 1975) (Capacity Reduction Agreements Case), DOT-T-1 through 5
(1974).
21 Notably, the Board would appear to have accepted this model of regulated-
carrier behavior. In a decision in its recent Domestic Passenger Fare Investiga-
tion [hereinafter cited as DPFI] CAB Docket No. 21866 (April 9, 1971), the
Board said:
We find . . . that the higher the fare level in relation to cost,
the more capacity carriers will offer and the lower load factors will
be; and, conversely, the lower the fare level, the less capacity car-
riers will operate and the higher load factors will be.
CAB Order No. 71-4-54 at 23 (April 9, 1971).
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FIGURE 1
(For illustration purposes only; not drawn to scale)
material to them. The passenger's cost of service, however, is great-
ly dependent upon the price/load-factor option chosen by the
Board. In essence, the passenger's "full cost" of travel is the ticket
price plus the "cost" of delays he (or she) incurs in waiting for a
flight. We see in Figure 1 the rather obvious proposition that as the
average load factor rises the associated break-even fare falls. If
this were the only element in the passenger's cost of service, public
policy would dictate a fare consistent with load factors of near one
hundred percent. As load factor rises, however, delay cost increas-
es. Passengers find it more difficult to secure accommodations on
the desired departure, and flights are fewer, with more time in be-
tween departures. When translated into money terms, this delay
cost is as characterized in Figure 1. The passenger's full cost of
service is thus the sum of these two types of cost (that is, ticket
price plus delay), and, given these two curves, for some average
load factor (that is, ALF*) level the "full cost" is at a minimum.
In our recent Brookings publication, George Douglas and I came
to the conclusion that the Board has chosen too low a load factor
1975]
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standard (that is, fifty-five percent as opposed to sixty to sixty-five
percent) and consequently is promulgating fares which are too
high.2" This means that the typical passenger is paying an "excess
fare" which exceeds the value of the reduction in delay. This in
turn means a higher full cost of service with no offsetting higher
profits to carriers. Thus, there is regulation-induced excess capacity
which represents a dead-weight loss to society.' Douglas and I
estimate that during 1969 air passengers paid excess fares to domes-
tic trunk carriers ranging between $366 million and $538 million,
for which they received quality improvements valued at between
$118 million and $182 million. This leaves a dead-weight welfare
loss in trunk-line service for 1969 of between $248 million and
$356 million.'
Since 1969 the Board has established target load factors of fifty-
five percent as opposed to the then-prevailing levels of approxi-
mately fifty percent. However, the recent increases in fuel prices
have raised the optimal average load factor to approximately sixty-
five to seventy percent, so the present configuration of service is still
characterized by efficiency costs on the same order of magnitude.
Based on total domestic trunk revenues of $9,316 million for the
year ending September, 1973, this implies a current annual welfare
cost for trunk service ranging between $355 million and $509 mil-
lion.
There are additional costs of airline regulation. First, there is
evidence that the relationship between the Board and the industry
has resulted in a level (and structure) of fares which maximizes
total capacity rather than one which maximizes total passenger traf-
fic.' This is illustrated in Figure 2.2" Since some costs are "external"
to the airlines and their passengers, this behavior has quite likely
resulted in excessive investments in airport and airway facilities as
well as excessive consumption of fuel.
22 In the DPFI the Board announced its intention of in effect setting fares at
levels which would cover costs (plus a reasonable return on investment) on the
basis of an industry-wide average load factor of fifty-five percent.
' See also DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 14, ch. 6.
24 DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 14, at 172.
" See De Vany, Effects of Price and Entry Regulation on Airline Output,
Capacity and Efficiency, BELL J. OF EcON. AND MANAGEMENT ScI. at 327-45
(Spring 1975); and DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 14, at 60, 176-77.
2 Rather than choosing fare level F*, the Board has chosen fare level F**.
Figure 2 is adapted from De Vany, supra note 25.
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Secondly, the Board's policy of protecting existing carriers from
competition by preventing the entry of new carriers 7 not only
means that the public has been denied lower price-quality options
but that potentially more efficient carriers have not been able to
test the efficiency of existing carriers. Whether new carriers would
have significantly lower costs is subject to considerable debate, but
evidence on relative carrier costs and the evidence from unregu-
lated markets certainly raises this possibility."
Finally, there are numerous regulator-imposed constraints on
routings and service requirements which serve to raise costs.' To my
27 Since regulation was established in 1938, not a single (new) trunk carrier
has entered the market, and not a single trunk has exited the market except
through merger.
21 See Gordon, Airline Costs and Managerial Efficiency, TRANSPORTATION ECO-
NOMICS: A CONFERENCE at 61-94 (1965); Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market
Performance, BELL J. OF ECON. AND MANAGEMENT Sci. at 399-424 (Autumn
1972); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFEC-
TIONS, ch. 11 (1970); DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 14, at 141-49.
29 Some of these have been instituted to assure service to points that the in-
cumbent carrier might not ordinarily serve. To some extent, then, such costs are
a revealing of the resource costs of pursuing certain social (non-economic) ob-
jectives.
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knowledge a precise estimate of all these costs has not been made.
In my judgment this figure would be in the neighborhood of $1 bil-
lion per year, or around ten percent of total domestic trunk-line
revenues.'
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF DEREGULATED MARKETS
Costs of regulation such as those described above implicitly
assume some alternative, usually ideally efficient markets. In real
life, critics of regulation must be careful to identify realistic alter-
natives. Two such alternatives immediately come to mind: (a) "en-
lightened" regulation, and (b) total deregulation. On the one hand,
it is entirely possible that a truly enlightened regulator could elim-
inate most of the costs described above. For example, in an ideal
setting the CAB could adopt target load factors by market char-
acteristic and, by regulating fares accordingly, eliminate the costs
of "excess capacity." There are two significant problems with this
approach, however. First, a regulator is inherently less capable of
administering resources "correctly" than is an individual competi-
tive entrepreneur. The regulator neither has information as good
as that of the entrepreneur nor does he (or she) have the appro-
priate incentives. Secondly, in terms of fact (versus theory), the
performance of the existing regulatory agencies causes one to be
extremely skeptical of achieving good industry performance by
relying upon regulation.
At the other extreme is the hypothetical completely deregulated,
competitive market." The theoretical argument for the efficiency
of deregulated airline markets is extremely powerful. The airline
industry appears to conform closely to the necessary conditions for
price competition: no significant scale economies," fairly elastic
(firm) demand, relative difficulty of coordinating pricing and out-
put policies (that is, collusion), and, in the absence of controls,
relative ease of entry and exit. Looking at the question of optimal
3' Note that these losses are not simply transfers from consumers to producers
or from consumers to consumers. They represent the economic cost of squandered
resources.
31 For this discussion, by the term "deregulation" and its derivatives we mean
the elimination of economic regulation only, not the elimination of safety regula-
tion.
32 See DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 14, at 13-18, and the sources cited there-
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price and load factor, with fare flexibility a carrier would have an
alternative means of attracting additional passengers: lowering
price. The carrier could then judge the most effective way of at-
tracting business: lowering price or providing more service. The
result would be the appropriate market combination of price and
quality. Moreover, in some markets there may well be a distribu-
tion of price-and-quality combinations that is desired by the pub-
lic.' Free markets provide incentives for this configuration to
come about.
Under conditions of free entry and free exit, firms would have
to stand a more substantive "market test" of their efficiency. More
efficient firms would survive, and inefficient firms would be forced
to exit. The removal of restrictions on routings would result in
lower costs to consumers, and uneconomical markets would be
abandoned. There might well be some "market imperfections,"'
but in economic efficiency terms these would probably be fairly
minor.
Of course, we would like to rely upon facts concerning deregu-
lated markets as well as upon theory. Unfortunately, we do not
have ideal tests of deregulation since the CAB has preempted tru-
ly comparable experiments. We do have two deregulated markets,
however, that are similar in many respects to CAB-regulated mar-
kets, except, of course, for differences in the degree of regulation.
First, we have the intrastate markets, which are outside CAB
jurisdiction. Prior to 1965, the California Public Utilities Com-
mission regulated maximum prices in intrastate air service, but
not entry and exit.' Professor William A. Jordan has made an
extensive study of the history and economic character of this
market and has concluded that in virtually all respects the Califor-
nia intrastate airline market is much more efficient than compar-
3 For example, a low-load-factor, low-intensity, high-amenity, high-priced
service catering to business travelers, and a low-cost, "no-frills" service catering
to the vacation traveler. At present such specialization is limited-another cost of
regulation.
I These include: (a) collusion over prices and/or service, (b) quasi-monopoly
service in marginal markets, and (c) inefficient mixes of aircraft and frequencies.
On the latter point, see George W. Douglas, Equilibrium in a Deregulated Air
Transport Market (paper delivered at a seminar on Problems of Regulation and
Public Utilities, Dartmouth College, 1972, processed).
11 Since then control over entry and exit has been instituted.
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able interstate (CAB-regulated) markets.' Even today, with tight-
er regulation, fares in California intrastate markets average much
less than fares in comparable interstate markets.
A similar result obtains in the Texas intrastate market, where
Southwest Airlines, a carrier licensed by the Texas Aeronautics
Commission, is in competition with Braniff Airways, a CAB-reg-
ulated trunk carrier, and Texas International Airways, a CAB-
regulated local service carrier. Despite having its service introduc-
tion postponed nearly four years because of judicial challenges by
Braniff and Texas International, the carrier is now serving the
"golden triangle" (Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio) at a profit,
charging fares which average some twenty to fifty percent less
than comparable CAB-regulated fares.
The other major unregulated market is that of commuter air-
lines, previously known as "air taxis." In 1952, faced with "doing
something" about a plethora of illegal (interstate) air taxi opera-
tions, the Board simply exempted from regulation7 any interstate
air carrier which utilized aircraft having no more than 12,500
pounds gross takeoff weight.8 At that time, it was thought that no
operator could provide profitable scheduled operations with such
small aircraft. Subsequently, however, technology changed, and
equipment of this weight is now capable of carrying up to nine-
teen passengers at reasonable comfort and speed and at relatively
low cost. Today, there are literally hundreds of such operators
which provide regularly-scheduled service to low-density markets-
and in some higher-density markets, often in direct competition
with trunk and local service carriers. Since, with few exceptions,
these carriers receive no government subsidy, and since they are
handicapped in terms of the size of the aircraft they may operate,
they tend to serve marginal or uncertain routes; thus, their turn-
over is judged by some as being fairly high. It is notable, how-
ever, that such unregulated carriers serve many markets that CAB-
regulated carriers have chosen to abandon and that their service,
W JORDAN, supra note 28. See also CAB BUREAU OF ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS,
TRAFFIC, FARES, AND COMPETITION: Los ANGELES-SAN FRANCISCO AIR TRAVEL
CORRIDOR (1965).
'
7 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1348(e) (1958).
88 That standard was recently changed to a thirty passenger capacity and a net
payload of no more than 7,500 pounds.
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given their equipment and the characteristics of their markets, is
safe and reliable.
MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST "DEREGULATION"
By no means has this brief discussion touched on all the char-
acteristics of deregulated markets. In the space remaining, how-
ever, I would like to respond to the more significant criticisms
raised by those who oppose less regulation of the domestic air
transport system.39
1. Without regulation, flights would be unsafe. Critics of dereg-
ulation argue that regulation is needed to insulate carriers from
market forces; otherwise, the "dog-eat-dog" atmosphere of free
competition would lead carriers to skimp on safety, to the public's
detriment. There are several answers to this. First, the govern-
mental instrumentality charged with air safety is the FAA, not the
CAB. Deregulation, as I have defined it, would leave the FAA's
role unaffected.
Secondly, there is little direct evidence that economic regulation
has had any effect on air safety. For example, the Board has nev-
er withdrawn or suspended the certificate of a trunk operator on
grounds that its operations were unsafe, and its constraints on
entry have seldom if ever revolved around issues of safety. One
variant of the safety hypothesis is that high profits mean safe op-
erations. However, when I tested this naive proposition over the
period 1939 to 1953, for which there appeared to be adequate
variations in profit rates and fatality rates to make a test feasible,
I found the result contrary to what critics of deregulation would
have predicted. While the net effect was small and statistically
not meaningful, the result actually showed a positive relationship
between industry profit rates and industry fatality rates."0
" See AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION OF THE
SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH (1975); Hotz,
A Dangerous Fantasy, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, April 28, 1975,
at 11; Hotz, The Dergulation Debate, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
May 19, 1975, at 9.
4OThe result was as follows: Domestic fatality rate (passenger fatalities per
100 million miles flown) = 1.76 + (.009 x domestic industry profit rate).
(T-statistics on variable coefficient = .25; equation R2 = .08.) Data sources:
CAB, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS: 1971 EDITION 554 (1972); and CAVES,
supra note 10, at 392.
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Finally, after all, the flight crew is not likely to take significant
risks. As Shakespeare put it in The Tempest (Act I, Scene 1):
Gonzales: ... yet remember whom thou hast aboard.
Boatswain: None that I more love than myself."
2. Under deregulation there would be wholesale abandonment of
markets. For example, a recent Air Transport Association (ATA)
study (in response to Senator Kennedy's request for the industry
to identify those scheduled routes where service might be reduced
or eliminated under deregulation) concluded that of the 994 trunk-
carrier routes analyzed, 372 would be candidates for elimination
under deregulation, while nearly all of the remaining 622 could
experience sharp curtailment of service.'
This prediction is based, in part, on the assumption that the
CAB presently constrains the abandonment of hundreds of mar-
kets. This is not true. The trunk carriers now serve many markets
their certificates do not require them to serve, and in any case,
trunk carriers have found little difficulty in obtaining CAB permis-
sion to abandon markets of their choosing. The prediction is also
based on the argument that the present pricing structure enables a
considerable amount of cross-subsidy. The common belief that
cross-subsidy is widespread-that carriers purposely serve losing
markets and siphon off profits from other markets to defray losses-
is not credible. It is hard to believe that carrier managements
view their respective firms as eleemosynary institutions. (If they
do, then surely their stockholders should be made aware of this
fact!) George Douglas and I have concluded that the extent of
such cross-subsidy is greatly overstated,' and apparently the Board
agrees." If this is true then presumably most alleged "losing" mar-
kets are in fact self-supporting and would not be abandoned if
regulation were terminated.
Even if one other carrier abandons a market, this is not to say
41 1 am indebted to Mancar Olson for pointing out these lines, also quoted in
W. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 49 (2d ed.
1967).
1 AIR TRANSPORT ASSocIATION, supra note 39. The ATA also suggested that
the 826 nonstop routes of the local service carriers identified as presently receiving
subsidy would be candidates for elimination under deregulation.
4 DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 14, ch. 6.
T4See CAB Order No. 74-3-82 at 66-72 (March 18, 1974). Moreover, the
Board has recently enunciated a policy of eliminating any cross-subsidy. Id. at 68.
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that some other carrier could not serve it at a profit.' In 1973 Tex-
as International Airways, a local service carrier, applied to the
CAB to delete service at College Station, Texas. Reason? Texas
International was losing its market to a small College Station-
based commuter, Davis Airlines. Both were offering service to
Dallas and to Houston. Both charged $27 to Dallas, while Daxis'
$20 rate to Houston was a dollar less than Texas International's.
But while Davis was making money at these rates, the Board was
forced to conclude that Texas International was losing $41 per en-
planed passenger."' In short, while Davis's cost per passenger was
in the neighborhood of $20-$27, Texas International's cost was in
the neighborhood of $62-$68. Thus, under deregulation the local
service carriers might well become more efficient and thus be able
to serve some markets now receiving Federal support without the
need of subsidy.
There also may be points which would be abandoned if car-
riers were restrained to the CAB-regulated fare, but if free to charge
a higher fare (if need be), carriers could serve such markets at a
profit. Finally, even if CAB-certificated carriers abandoned these
markets one must not overlook the outstanding success of the (un-
regulated) commuter airlines in providing service to small com-
munities and serving low-density markets. According to the com-
muter airlines' trade association, 131 commuter airlines listed
schedules in the October 1, 1974, issue of the Official Airline
Guide. Of the 665 airports analyzed, 210 (31.6 percent) were
served exclusively by commuter airlines; 256 (38.5 percent) were
served exclusively by CAB-certificated airlines; and 199 (29.9
percent) were served jointly by certificated and commuter airlines.
In serving a total of 409 airports, the commuter airlines served
over 1,530 city-pair markets." These unregulated carriers have ac-
complished this record despite constraints on the size of aircraft
they may fly." One must conclude that of markets that were aban-
Perhaps the replacement carrier is more efficient, or the point is more com-
plementary to its route systems.
4' See CAB Order No. 73-4-49 (April 10, 1973).
47 National Air Transportation Association, AirTran News at 16 (April, 1975).
- 14 C.F.R. § 2982 limits commuters to operating aircraft of not more than
thirty passengers and not more than 7,500 pounds payload. (Exceptions to these
limitations are occasionally granted on a case-by-case basis.)
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doned under deregulation, most of them would be picked up by
commuter carriers.
3. Under deregulation, only a handful of carriers would survive.
This could happen, but if it did such industry concentration
would not be a problem. Since there are no pervasive scale econo-
mies, there is little reason to anticipate this outcome any more
than one might anticipate the emergence of several hundred oper-
ators. Even if only a handful of carriers did survive, however, the
ease of entry into deregulated markets would act to "police" the
market and thus prevent any abuses of monopoly power.
4. Under deregulation, prices and schedules would be unstable.
Without doubt, under deregulation fares would be less "stable"
than at present. After all, regulation has virtually precluded price
competition. However, rates would not fluctuate broadly. The rea-
son is that information is a scarce resource, and carriers can re-
duce this expense and thus attract passengers by keeping such rates
relatively stable. The same is true of schedules. An unregulated
carrier stands to gain considerable ill will by not keeping sched-
ules, or, put another way, an unregulated carrier may gain a good
reputation by maintaining published schedules. Certainly the ex-
perience of the intrastate airlines and the commuter airlines is in-
consistent with the prediction of unstable rates and schedules un-
der deregulated conditions."9
5. Under deregulation, rates would be too high. While there
might be pockets of monopoly power and some limit-pricing, the
evidence from the intrastate markets suggests that this is unlikely to
be a problem. Notably, in the (unregulated) commuter markets,
prices tend to be low as compared with CAB-regulated rates. A
comparison of the commuter fare structure with that of the trunk
carriers reveals that the commuters charge less for distances up to
126 miles (and more thereafter). A comparison of the unregulated
commuter fare structure with that of the local service carriers
(standard fare) reveals that the commuters charge less for dis-
tances up to 312 miles. Given that Part 298 regulations tend to
constrain commuter carriers to short-haul service (the commuter
carriers' average stage length is only seventy-five miles), thie would
appear to be rather strong evidence that the elimination of maximum
" See JORDAN, supra note 28, chs. 5-10.
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fare regulation would not lead to excessively high rates."
6. Under deregulation, rates would be too low (i.e., chaos).
There is no theoretical reason to expect chaotic competition. More-
over, evidence on airline performance in the relatively unregulated
commuter and intrastate markets fails to reveal any chaos. In any
event, predatory pricing would be constrained by the antitrust laws. 1
As George Douglas is fond of saying, any instability that did oc-
cur would be in the executive offices of some of the airlines, rather
than in the basic system itself.
7. Under deregulation, the carriers would not cooperate. Critics
of deregulation argue that without Board compulsion carriers
would not, for example, interline passengers. That is difficult
to believe, for surely there would be a profit incentive to mesh
schedules and cooperate in the transfer of passengers. Also, we ob-
serve such "cooperation" in unregulated markets.
Carriers point out, however, that deregulation would make them
liable for antitrust violation and that fear of prosecution would
make them very wary of entering into cooperative working ar-
11The so-called "fare formula" for trunk coach travel (not including tax) is
as follows: $13.85 "terminal charge" plus 7.79¢ per mile for the first 500 miles;
5.94¢ per mile for 501-1500 miles; and 5.71V per mile for 1501 and over (CAB
Order No. 74-12-109 (December 27, 1974). This is closely approximated by the
following regression:
F = 17.02 + .062 M (R" - 1.0)
where F - total fare (net of tax), and
M = mileage
Local service carriers are allowed to charge 130 percent of the coach fare as
their "standard" fare, and they usually do so in their non-trunk-competitive mar-
kets:
F = 22.24 + .081 M (R 2  1.0)
Fares charged by commuter airlines are unregulated. A random sample of fifty-
four markets in which commuters provide service was examined with the follow-
ing results (OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE, June 1975; all fares were net of taxes):
F = 10.755 + .111 M (R2 = .811)
In twenty-three of these markets commuters competed with local service or trunk
carriers, and in such cases commuters typically match the local service or trunk
tariff. In those thirty-one markets in the sample served only by commuters, the
result was:
F = 9.45 + .122 M (R' = .896)
I am indebted to Leroy Laney for collecting this data and performing the re-
gressions.
5' Predatory behavior under deregulation is unlikely because it would fail due
to free entry. [This contrasts with the present circumstance where predatory
service competition stands some chance of success, since the Board can be relied
upon to constrain (re)entry.] Cf. Hamilton & Kawahara, Predatory Nonprice
Competition: The Case of Hawaii Interisland Air Transportation, ANTITRUST
LAw AND ECON. REV., no. 1 at 83-97 (1974).
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rangements. This problem, I believe, is overstated. First, the vast
majority of agreements now filed at the Board do not receive prior
immunity." Secondly, in testimony before Senator Kennedy's Sub-
committee, the Justice Department stated that under removal of
antitrust immunity the carriers would have little to fear with re-
spect to non-anticompetitive agreements such as interlining, joint
maintenance, and the like. 3 If it did appear that the antitrust laws
would be too constraining (for example, carriers appeared to be
too risk-adverse), it might be desirable to grant the Board very
limited power to grant antitrust immunity, under very strict stand-
ards.
8. Under deregulation, the adjustment process would be trau-
matic. Immediate and total -deregulation would probably mean a
very painful adjustment process. Carrier management would have
to go through a learning experience and might make many mis-
takes. For example, the concurrent route award system causes a "run
to the courthouse" type of behavior due to the existence of monop-
oly rents." Without regulatory barriers on entry, carrier myopia
might lead to excessive entry and cause a difficult "shaking out"
period.
Such transitional difficulties could be minimized, however, by
phasing deregulation over time and carefully orchestrating the re-
laxation of constraints. Such a strategy for reform also has the
obvious advantage of assuring deregulation's skeptics that should
their fears be grounded, should the performance of the industry
worsen, then the "experiment" could be halted or reversed."
THE AVIATION ACT OF 1975 AND ITS EFFECTS ON AIR CARRIERS
As mentioned earlier (and no doubt discussed at length by other
contributors to this issue of the Journal), the Administration's
Aviation Act of 1975 is now before Congress. This bill would al-
low more entry (of new carriers as well as expansion by existing
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 412, 40 U.S.C. § 1382 (1973) gives the
Board very wide latitude in approving intercarrier agreements (e.g., the recently-
terminated capacity limitations). Most of these are handled routinely by Board
staff, under authority granted by the Board.
11 See a summary of the subcommittee's findings at page 607, supra.
"On this see DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 14, at 117, 118.
Thus, the design of the decontrol program is extremely important.
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carriers), make certain abandonments easier, prevent significantly
anticompetitive agreements, promulgate a "zone of reasonableness"
for pricing, and place stricter constraints on mergers; it would not,
however, compromise safety regulation by the FAA nor would it
end the subsidy program.
Since its introduction (and even before), the prospective Act
has been the subject of much controversy. Proponents have argued
forcefully that the result would be lower fares, especially in long-
distance, high-density markets. With the public's perception of
lower fares in comparable non-CAB-regulated markets (for ex-
ample, in California and Texas), this argument has been difficult
to counter. On the other hand, critics of the proposal have argued
with equal force that while some consumers might realize lower
fares, others, perhaps the majority, would experience fare increases
and/or a loss of service. These issues were addressed briefly above.
It is instructive, however, to take note that the major critics of the
proposal are existing carriers and their representatives (or people
who depend upon them), and the extent of their opposition is
pretty much a function of what they feel they stand to lose if the
proposal were enacted. While no one can guarantee that reform
would result in no losers, it should be kept in mind that the Avia-
tion Act of 1975 is specifically designed to give existing carriers
an opportunity to adjust their operations and adapt to a new regu-
latory environment before the proposal's major provisions became
fully effective. For this reason (and others), the predictions of
the doom-sayers are, in my judgment, grossly overstated."
It is almost universally accepted that the demand for air travel
is positively related to the general state of the economy. In techni-
cal terms, air travel has been found to be a "superior good," mean-
ing that for a given rate of increase (decrease) in aggregate eco-
nomic activity, the rate of increase (decrease) in air travel will be
even greater. Statistical studies show, in fact, that the (percentage)
response in air travel demand is about double the (percentage)
change in economic growth. While in many cases actual experi-
ence does not bear them out, experts are predicting a strong eco-
nomic recovery and real growth of approximately five percent an-
" For more detail on the discussion in the remainder of this section, see Miller,
Effects of the Administration's Proposed Aviation Act of 1975 on Air Carrier
Finances, TRANSPORTATION J. (forthcoming).
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nually through the remainder of this decade. This means that if
real costs (and presumably real air fares) do not rise, air travel
should grow approximately ten percent per year."
Aside from the question of growth, probably of most concern
is whether reform would lead to a greater or lesser equilibrium
stock of airline investment. In other words, would reform lead to
lower-than-normal industry profits (that is, excess investment) or
higher-than-normal industry profits (that is, a "shortage" of indus-
try investment)? As it turns out, this question is too close to call.
While most expect fares to fall, the effect on (equilibrium) indus-
try investment depends on whether demand is sufficiently price
elastic so that the rise in break-even load factor is exceeded by
the rise in actual load factor. The evidence suggests that if de-
mand price elasticity (in absolute value terms) is greater than ap-
proximately 1.3, then the industry would earn higher profits as a
result of an immediate price reduction, whereas if it is less the in-
dustry would earn lower profits. The Board's figure of 0.7 is per-
haps the best-known estimate, but it contradicts staff estimates,
which center around 1.3, and most academic studies, which range
from just in excess of unity to well over 2.0. As a matter of per-
spective, everything else equal, a sixteen percent reduction in av-
erage fares would yield losses of approximately $660 million an-
nually if the Board's estimate is correct and profits of approximate-
ly $675 million if price elasticity is 2.0.
Thus, the reduction in fares expected from regulatory reform
would not be likely in and of itself to have much of an impact on
industry (or individual carriers') profits." In any event, the major
provisions of the Act would not become fully effective for five
years, and, if projections of economic growth and estimates of de-
mand income elasticity are correct, air travel should be approxi-
57 The most rapidly rising component of cost-fuel-appears to have tapered
off in its nominal rate of increase.
"8 While the effects on individual carriers could vary, the most important con-
sideration with respect to the impact on individual firms would appear to be the
projection of industry profits. The reason is that the differential carrier impacts
would show up primarily in terms of excess (or insufficient) flight equipment.
When the industry is earning normal returns on investment, flight equipment can
be bought and sold at rates reasonably consistent with book value. Thus, even
though the industry may not be able to expand or contract capacity quickly, in-
dividual firms are indeed in a position to do so.
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mately fifty percent higher by then." In sum, the argument that
the Administration's proposal would force a substantial portion of
the industry into bankruptcy strains credibility. If under this pro-
gram a carrier (or carriers) went into receivership, it would have
to be credited to that carrier's (or those carriers') inefficiencies-
not to a disruption precipitated by the Aviation Act of 1975.
CONCLUSION
The prospect of substantial reform of domestic airline regulation
has never been better. Academics have long urged decontrol, and
for the first time their arguments are being taken seriously by those
in authority.
The keys to success, in my judgment, are three. First, this must
remain a nonpartisan issue. Just as economists from left to right
support decontrol, regulatory reform should appeal to Democrats
and Republicans. Secondly, policy makers must take a long-run
view of regulatory policy. While transitional problems are apparent
and immediate, one must not lose sight of the longer-term bene-
fits. Finally, there must be a willingness on the part of the "dereg-
ulators" to accept a phasing in of the program over time as well
as a willingness on the part of deregulation's skeptics to go along
with a meaningful experiment. In my judgment, the proposed Avi-
ation Act of 1975 meets this test.
' Of course, the carriers would have several years to make adjustments in
capacity even if travel did not grow.
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